The Morality of Psychopaths?

In recent work Joshua Greene argues that when we realize that many of our characteristically deontological moral judgments arise from emotional reactions rather than deontological reasoning, we will lose our confidence in these deontological judgments.  In contrast, when we learn that many utilitarian judgments arise from cognitive processes that engage in cost/benefit analysis, then this vindicates these judgments.  And (to simplify Greene’s reasoning) the conclusion of all this  is that we should become utilitarians.

For example, when people consider the trolley case they usually make utilitarian judgments, since this case is not so emotionally loaded.  But, when we consider the footbridge case, in which we have to physically push somebody in front of the runaway train, then we make a deontological judgment to the effect that the end does not justify the means.  This judgment, Greene argues, is caused by an emotional reaction rather than deontological cognitive processes.  

If we look at the empirical literature on moral judgment, we also learn that psychopaths and people with lesions in the emotional centers of their brains are more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments.  These people tend to directly conclude that we should push the fat man in front of the train.  And, if asked to evaluate a scenario in which we could say our own lives only by smothering some baby, then these people quickly judge that we should do it, whereas others with normal emotional capacities have to think carefully about this before reaching a conclusion.

I was just curious about what people think about the following observation. Utilitarianism, as this last observation helps us to see, is in one way the morality of psychopaths.  This observation may lead us to doubt whether empirical research on moral judgment really does debunk these deontological judgments in the way that Greene and others think it does.  I agree that the evidence he appeals to undermines the idea that what he calls characteristically deontological judgments usually derive from moral reasoning.  But, does it really give us reason to think that, because of this, we should not trust/rely on these intuitions in our moral thinking?

It might seem a little silly to say that utilitarianism is the morality of people with brain damage or of psychopaths, and since we don’t want to be like such people, we shouldn’t be utilitarians.  But, it is interesting, I think, to think about that piece of data when considering the kinds of arguments that people like Greene give.  Thoughts?

A Troublesome Quartet

Based on the following line of thought, it seems to me that if one is a buck-passing existence-internalist who accepts a certain thesis about motivational diversity, then she or he should give up on one of those commitments or give up thinking that anything has intrinsic value. (There are other ways to frame the matter, of course.) But I’m not yet sure that the following line of thought is unproblematic. Feedback is welcome!

P1: (Intrinsic Value) Something has intrinsic value. [In other words: Something is worthy of being valued (by anyone) for its own sake.]

P2: (Fitting Attitudes Reduction) Something’s being worthy of being valued (by anyone) for its own sake just is for it to be such that there is reason for anyone to value it for its own sake.

C1: So, there is something such that there is reason for anyone to value it for its own sake. (from P1 and P2)

P3: (Existence-Internalist Thesis) For any thing X and any agent A, there is reason for A to value X for its own sake only if a (specified) X-related motivational fact about A obtains.

P4: (Motivational Diversity) For any thing X, there is some possible agent A such that the (specified) X-related motivational fact about A does not obtain.

C2: So, for any thing X, there is some possible agent A for whom there is not reason for A to value X for its own sake. (from P3 and P4)

C3: So, it is not the case that there is something such that there is reason for anyone to value it for its own sake. (from C2)

C4: So, C1 & C3 (Contradiction)