I don’t know too much about the philosophy of color, except for what you learn from examples people use in discussions about other topics. I’ve noticed that some people, to take one example, think that we should be error theorists about color: we falsely believe that surfaces have these mind-independent color features that they don’t really have, and therefore our color-judgments attributing these properties to surfaces are all systematically erroneous. This, if I am not mistaken, is Velleman’s view. He brings this up in a discussion about whether people’s belief in free will is some kind of systematic illusion of a similar sort. Other people, like Gibbard, think that an error-theory about color-judgments is too extreme; we should not attribute systematic errors to the folk unless no other, friendlier theory is available. One type of theory of a friendlier sort takes color-judgments to be judgments about dispositional properties: we judge things to be such that they tend to look a certain way to people. But, what are some other possible views?
Here’s what I am specifically interested in knowing: do you guys know if any philosophers have given expressivist views about color judgments? The idea would be something like this. In saying, for example, “the sky is blue” what people are doing is expressing their mental state of seeing the sky as blue. Now, what is their seeing it as blue supposed to mean here? Well, perhaps I would have done better to say something like “they express their mental state of its looking a certain particular way to them”. So, the state of judging something to have a certain color is closely tied, on this view, to the state of something looking/appearing a certain way to you. And, if you say that the thing has the color in question, then you are expressing this state of mind, rather than reporting it. (This, by the way, seems right: in calling something blue it seems better to say that I am expressing my state of mind of seeing it as blue than to say that I report its looking to blue to me.)
So, my first question is: do people know if this kind of view has been suggested? Here is a second question. If it has been suggested, has anybody combined it with a theory according to which, even though our color claims express our mental state of things’ appearing certain ways to us, they can be true or false in a sense: perhaps there are facts about color which consist in how these surfaces would appear to people in certain, naturalistically describable ideal conditions. So, if how the surface appears to me matches how it would appear to the relevant people in these conditions, and I say it has the color in question, then my claim is true. If I say it has a certain color, and it is not the one people would see the thing as having in the ideal conditions, then my claim is false. Or something like that.
I am not pushing this view, and I don’t know how plausible I think it is; I am just asking whether people know of philosophers who have discussed these particular ideas. Since people like being expressivists about all sorts of things, surely there are expressivisits about color judgments out there, or no?